

Historical Papers Communications historiques



The American View of War: the Revolutionary Perspective

Reginald C. Stuart

Volume 11, numéro 1, 1976

Québec 1976

URI : <https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/030802ar>

DOI : <https://doi.org/10.7202/030802ar>

[Aller au sommaire du numéro](#)

Éditeur(s)

The Canadian Historical Association/La Société historique du Canada

ISSN

0068-8878 (imprimé)

1712-9109 (numérique)

[Découvrir la revue](#)

Citer cet article

Stuart, R. C. (1976). The American View of War: the Revolutionary Perspective. *Historical Papers / Communications historiques*, 11(1), 21–47.
<https://doi.org/10.7202/030802ar>

All rights reserved © The Canadian Historical Association/La Société historique du Canada, 1976

Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne.

<https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/>

érudit

Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit.

Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche.

<https://www.erudit.org/fr/>

REGINALD C. STUART
UNIVERSITY OF
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

The American View of War: the Revolutionary Perspective

Scholars have commonly assumed that Americans developed a total or absolute view of war from the colonial period forward.¹ The first American encounter with limited war was with the Korean conflict, which analysts saw as a challenge to American concepts of strategy.² But there is strong evidence that the Americans of the Revolutionary generation accepted the main themes and even some of the details of the limited-war mentality which pervaded contemporary European thought and statecraft. Certain ideas emerge better than others, in part because of the selectivity of historical witnesses, and in part because focussing on the Revolution alone does not cover a sufficient span of time for the concepts to bloom. The evidence seems clear, nonetheless, and suggests that we may need to revise our understanding of the historical development of the American view of war.

The limited-war mentality of the eighteenth century was a complex historical tapestry. Between 1648 and 1789, the historical experience of the wars of religion, the political ambitions and intellectual outlook of statesmen and princes, the nature of states and their interrelationships, the resources available to rulers, the nature of armies, and the technology of the time were all woven into a warfare which was indecisive and seems remarkably restrained. Alone, or in combination, these factors touched most statesmen, soldiers, politicians, and intellectuals in an age where restraint in all things was accepted as a desirable social value. Four major themes characterized this mentality: the just-war tradition, which was clearest in clerical thought and an important part of what constituted international law by the 1760s; conscious restraint and humane codes in warfare; the belief that war was an instrument of state policy; and the conviction that war flowed from nature and was thus largely unavoidable, albeit controllable.³

Thinkers of the time were not as pacific as one might suppose, given their frequent and withering denunciations of war. Most saw a place for force in human affairs, but sought to limit its use. Few believed that it was possible to eradicate war entirely. The reflective men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw both good and evil in man. Although optimistic, they did not divorce themselves from reality as they understood it. Americans had much the same outlook. Few, however, possessed the coherent view of war which grouping these ideas implies. Concomitantly, many accepted and tried to apply one or more of them.

The just-war theme was common, and commonly abused, since the term was sufficiently elastic to be employed by either side in a martial dispute. Radical Americans in particular went to great lengths to justify their actions. Many colonials were extremely reluctant to embrace revolution and saw a resort to arms as a last refuge. The movement of the political debate and the inchoate body of theory which radical colonial leaders transformed into positive resolutions in both provincial and continental assemblies paralleled the transition to the use of force. At first this was orchestrated mob activity, but increasingly the militia came into play. The long train of abuses attributed first to Parliament and then to George III justified rebellion for many.

The just-war idea originated in the Old Testament and was initially synonymous with the crusade. The New Testament shaped a pacifist Christianity which ultimately mutated when it absorbed classical thought on war and was linked to the Roman state. Original sin notwithstanding, St. Augustine and others argued that war was just and necessary to defend the earthly city against its enemies. The just-war idea was therefore firmly rooted by holy sanction in a secular, political sphere.⁴ By the Renaissance, legists, philosophers, soldiers, theologians, and statesmen accepted several criteria. A just war had to be defensive, be to redress real and unassuaged grievances, seek only justice and not conquest, and be formally declared so that it was waged under sovereign political authority with appropriate restraint. By the age of the Revolution, sanction for a just war was found in the laws of nature, as well as the laws of God and in the customary usage of nations. Formal declarations were infrequent by the 1750s, and even in the early seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius admitted that "to repel force, or to punish a delinquent, the law of nature requires no definition [declaration]."⁵

War was a refuge, but survival of the state had become a primary value. When injuries were received, a petition for redress was a mandatory response. This refused, a sovereign could call for war with a clear conscience. Self-defence was automatically just, for states as for individuals. Each had fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property. Resorting to war resembled appealing to the courts for redress of civil grievances.⁶ But since there were no international courts, the case was submitted to God in trial by combat if rulers could not agree and thought the issue of sufficient importance. To be sure, statesmen often paid little more than lip service to these formal requirements, but the rhetoric of the just-war idea was remarkably widespread nonetheless, and proper form was important to the ruling elites of the age.⁷

This verbiage was more than sanctimonious veneer over pasteboard cynicism. The just-war idea was an intellectual instrument whereby thinkers and statesmen harmonized violence and civilization and made war compatible with nature, God, reason, common sense, and necessity, all compelling forces in the eighteenth-century world. Although English writers, along with the classics, dominated the reading habits of educated Americans at the time, the revolu-

tionaries of the 1770s clearly worked within the vaster body of knowledge compiled and published during the previous centuries.⁸

As Britain became more menacing to the colonials, the just defence of political rights was viewed increasingly in martial terms. An anonymous letter to the Virginia Convention reminded the delegates that liberty had been won by the sword in the past and that duty demanded that it be taken up again, if necessary. The Boston Port Act stirred Thomas Mason to say:

. . . you must draw your swords in a just cause and rely upon that God who assists the righteous to support your endeavours to preserve the liberty he gave, and the love of which he hath implanted in your hearts, as essential to your nature.⁹

Alexander Hamilton, building a reputation as a pamphleteer by refuting the later loyalist Samuel Seabury in "A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress, & C," stressed that self-preservation was a "first principle" of human nature, and that when "lives and properties are at stake," men need not scruple over using violence.¹⁰ Thomas Jefferson, in a "Summary View of the Rights of the Colonies," argued that armed resistance to the king's troops was just since they had refused to submit to local laws. Christopher Gadsden, while not for violence, thought that "the only way to prevent the sword from being used is to have it ready."¹¹ But few were prepared to accept open rebellion in 1774.

The danger seemed shockingly real, however, after the skirmishes at Lexington and Concord. A letter to Canadians on 29 May 1775 called for resistance against the "torrent of oppression . . ." John Adams vowed he would surrender everything else before the "Rights of my Country to a free Constitution." Once the people abandoned the right of defending self-government against encroachment, all was lost.¹² Congress authorized seizure of military stores at Ticonderoga and Crown point on the basis of "the great law of self-preservation," and a Fast Day Invocation, 12 June 1775, called for a redress of grievances and a restoration of invaded rights. The Six Nations of Indians were told on 13 July that Americans "do not take up the hatchet and struggle for honor and conquest," but rather waged a just war of self-defence. An address to Ireland listed American grievances and stated that arms had been taken up in defence of persons and property. By October 1775 Congress had formed a "Hostile Acts" committee to catalogue British perfidy and hence justify the American resort to arms.¹³ One pamphlet argued that if rulers ignored the constitution then

. . . the subject has a right to defend his liberties by resistance, even unto blood . . . The law of God, the law of nature, and the gospel of Jesus Christ will justify them in so doing.¹⁴

The many tracts which were printed and circulated among the colonists to persuade them to support the radical cause all implicitly addressed the same issue. Now that shots had been fired, a commitment had been made. American leaders

needed all the assistance they could muster and they marshalled arguments which they believed would evoke a sympathetic and martial response. The just-war idea was one of the weapons in their arsenal of persuasion.

The newly minted patriot Thomas Paine emphasized the vulnerability of property and the dangers of a loss of liberty in "Thoughts on Defensive War." In January 1776 he argued that violent threats, the destruction of property, and the invasion of the country by "fire and sword" all sanctioned defensive warfare. Congress' "Declaration on the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms" was virtually a declaration of war on Britain. Because life, liberty, property, and happiness were rights bestowed by God and nature, a war in their defence was just.¹⁵ Americans were bent on redress, not conquest. A colonial army had been raised to "preserve and defend the lives, liberties and immunities" of Americans. Washington's manifesto to Canadians in September 1775 characterized the rebellion as a just war in defence of liberty, property, and family. Issue XIV of "The Crisis," published in New York, was titled "The present necessary defensive war, on the part of America, justified by the laws of God, Nature, Reason, State and Nation." Richard Henry Lee wrote that while the members of Congress wanted peace, war had been thrust upon them by their enemies. John Adams saw war as America's only refuge and William Ellery argued that Americans must forget their former love for Britain because now the sword would settle the dispute.¹⁶

By this time, radical colonial leaders, if not the bulk of uncommitted Americans, were in the process of shifting their allegiance. The traditional link with the crown was real, but fragile. If Americans had a concept of America, this was clearest to those radicals leading the revolutionary movement. Even when these Americans rejected the authority of Parliament, most turned to the King to adjust the apparent constitutional imbalance. But George III was too much a part of the system to exercise disinterested influence over its operation.

When this became clear, all colonials were faced with a hard choice which cleaved American society. Those radicals and moderates who accepted rebellion established new foci of allegiance. The whig view dictated that sovereignty lay with the people. When the compact of government was broken, power reverted to them momentarily. Reconstitution of the polity actually proved fairly simple as the provincial assemblies wrote constitutions and assumed local power. The Continental Congress dealt primarily with the war. Representing the will of the people, however, Congress provided the final sanction for the just war — the blessing of civil authority. The attempt to enforce the economic embargo against Britain, the declaration on taking up arms, the adoption of articles of war, the efforts to flush out and neutralize loyalists, the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal to privateers, and finally the Declaration of Independence itself, showed that radical American leaders had swiftly come to view the United States as a sovereign nation. At this point, rebellion bordered on international war, and as Robert Morris noted, those who supported independence were compelled to "Conquer or die."¹⁷ While shifting their allegiance, Americans temporarily

turned to God and nature to justify their actions, and nowhere was this more evident than in the plethora of sermons preached during the period from Lexington to Independence.

Clerics, especially congregationalists, had become notably political in their orientation, and most subscribed to the thrust of whig theory which sanctioned American resistance.¹⁸ Before April 1775, Daniel Shute, Samuel Stillman, and Jeremy Belknap, to take three examples, justified armed defence of political rights in terms of nature, God, Christ, and reason. Although initially vague about the aggressors against which Americans might have to defend themselves, by 1775, most colonial clerics were certain that the mother country was the source of danger. This was no war of conquest, ambition, greed, oppression, or revenge. The colonists sought to defend and recover human rights and their cause was, therefore, just and lawful, since such blessings flowed from nature, and hence from God.¹⁹

After 1775 clerical militancy quickened. Zabdiel Adams reasoned that "to stand fast in their liberties is the duty of every body of men." Daniel Batwell beseeched riflemen on a Congressional fast day to "go and defend our franchises, our wives, our children, and possessions." Once rights had been recovered, the colonists would "sheathe the sword". God had issued the call, and American consciences could be clear.²⁰ Samuel Cooke argued in 1777 that God commanded defensive wars because aggressors were murderers. Jacob Cushing went even further the following year:

If this war be just and necessary on our part, as past all doubt it is, then we are engaged in the work of the Lord, which obliges us (under God mighty in battle) to use our swords as instruments of righteousness, and calls us to the shocking, but necessary, important duty of shedding human blood; not only in defence of our property, life and religion, but in obedience to him who hath said, 'Curse be he that keepeth back his sword from blood.'²¹

God was the ultimate arbiter in a lawless and sinful world. Armed with political self-righteousness, religious imagery, and biblical parables, the ministers ushered Americans into a holy arena to defend their natural rights in trial by combat. Victory thus became a sign of divine favour, evidence of the "finger of God" as one minister decided.²²

Colonial politicians seemed no less convinced about the continuing justice of the war. Hamilton discreetly agreed with his fiancée that war grated on "every finer feeling of a delicate nature," but "the evident necessity and . . . defence of all that is valuable in society" overrode human sensitivity. At first, Hamilton justified the war by the laws of nature and the demands of necessity, but later he placed greater emphasis on the law of nations because he began to see that the United States had become one nation-state among many. John Jay mixed civil with religious sanctions in justifying the war.²³ The Virginia assembly distinguished sharply between the just cause of civil and international wars. The former defended life, liberty, and property, and the latter protected the govern-

ment and constitution. When these were attacked, the "rights of the whole community in their political capacity are hazarded." Washington remained convinced throughout the war that British aggression supplied all the necessary justification for taking up arms.²⁴

John Adams betrayed the millennial visions of his puritan temperament. He thought that the war would "inspire Us with many Virtues, which We have not, and correct many Errors, Follies, and Vices" which threatened American purity. Military setbacks would only "cure Americans of their vicious and luxurious and effeminate Appetites, Passions and Habits, a more dangerous Army to American liberty than Mr. Howes." Although active with Congress and the Board of War initially, Adams soon went overseas to lobby for European support and recognition. He thought France's cause against England was just because she had taken America's part. John Jay, who later spent a frustrating tour in Spain, told the Spanish foreign minister, the Count de Floridablanca, that the object of the war had transformed from redress of grievances into a quest for independence. He argued that the Americans would prosecute their struggle until victory, hoping to convince the dubious Dons that the United States was worth an investment.²⁵

Various pamphlets sustained the just-war rhetoric. "If there is a sin superior to every other," Tom Paine addressed Sir William Howe in *Crisis* No. 5, "it is that of wilful and offensive war." Attacked, invaded, imperilled, a people's duty was "to defend and preserve themselves, but in every other light and from any other cause, is war inglorious and detestable." The people held the sovereign authority to wage war and Paine saw the struggle against Britain as the "country's war, the public's war, or the war of the people in their own behalf, for the security of their natural rights, and the protection of their property."²⁶ In 1783 "A Moderate Whig" celebrated the American victory:

. . . if the ground be lawful, the call clear, the necessity cogent, the capacity probable, they that have the law of nature, the law of God, and the fundamental laws of the land on their side cannot want authority, although they may be destitute of a king to lead them.²⁷

Clearly, Americans were familiar with the just-war idea as it had been handed down and developed in western thought. They took special pains to satisfy themselves and others that all the criteria for armed resistance had been met. They did not engage in rebellion lightly, and if the pressures of the struggle created a crusading atmosphere, this was thin, despite the heady idealism which punctuated the war for independence. And even while they conducted their fight, American leaders wanted to soften the worst abuses of combat. In this way too, they stood firmly within the parameters of the limited-war mentality of their time.

The early legists divided their discussions of the laws of war into two parts — *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bellum*. The former meant the just-war idea. The latter was to insure that the struggle remained just. Means and ends were to be

carefully related. A war for justice dictated just treatment of the enemy and denied revenge. Actually, the restraint practised in eighteenth-century wars resulted from a combination of forces. Vestiges of chivalry among the upper classes created a community of ideals and codes of conduct among the officers of the day. Soldiers and statesmen alike feared reprisal for brutality and consequently restrained themselves and their men. Scant resources and political prudence, within the framework of the balance-of-power concept of international relations, directed rulers to define objectives carefully and not seek the overthrow of an antagonist. Ritual and gentlemanly conduct were valued for their own sakes. Finally, the good monarch wanted war to rest as lightly as possible upon the shoulders of the producing part of the population.²⁸ These forces combined to create by the eighteenth century a belief that war itself was coming under human control. Civilians were exempt from violence; prisoners were well-treated on the whole; the rules and conventions of war were generally observed.²⁹ Many exceptions occurred, to be sure, but rulers and soldiers did try to blend war and civilization.

Americans went to war in anger, but they had limited goals of self-defence, redress of grievances, and then independence. This last was not synonymous with British prostration, but merely the expulsion of British power from those colonies in rebellion. There is even evidence that the Americans might have stopped fighting had they received redress quickly.³⁰ Certainly, the effort to export the Revolution did not begin to match that evident in the other great revolutions of modern times. Military exigency, rather than ideological impulses, led to the invasion of Canada. The initial strident enthusiasm about a war for liberty calmed in time. Further, American leaders were for the most part tactically and strategically conventional, legends about riflemen and partisan warfare notwithstanding.³¹ Despite issuing loyalty oaths for all civil and military officers to sign, and despite a forced reliance upon the people as a military force, Congress issued no call for a *levée en masse*, as the French Convention did 23 August 1793. Instead, Congress worked through the state governments, sought haltingly to create a continental army and a command structure, and watched its commander-in-chief attempt to build a conventional army to defeat the British.

A potential contradiction arises at this point, and its configuration is unclear because by focussing on the American view of war during the Revolution, there is not a sufficient span of time to trace development and change in ideas. Some Americans saw their war as a crusade, but no crusade developed. The emotional commitment of the Americans was real, but sporadic and vastly exaggerated both by the rhetoric of the time and subsequent patriotic illusions. In addition, disputes over political jurisdiction between Congress and the states, the question of civil supremacy, and personal political ambition all sapped ideological energies. Washington winced when he had to rely on the militia, despite the good service it frequently rendered. Locally, the struggle was a more genuine civil war, more clearly a defence of home and hearth.

What we may have is a dichotomous American view of war. On the level of political and military leadership, this seems to have been a restrained eighteenth-

century perspective. With the people, however, the view may well have been more crusading and total. The sermons, pamphlets, and tracts of Congress designed for public consumption suggest the crusade; the private letters and comments suggest the limited-war view. The leaders suppressed historical anti-Catholicism and a long-bred hatred of France to seek French support on the basis of mutual self-interest. In time, Americans learned conventional diplomatic practices well enough to abandon their treaty ally when offered sufficiently attractive terms by their enemy.³² This dichotomy may be less contradictory than it seems on the surface since policy is always determined by the elites, who must then enlist popular support in a democratic system. The rational analysis which is effective around the council table may not be the best means of drumming up enthusiasm from the less tutored masses.

But the most important objective of the *jus in bellum* was mitigation of the social miseries consonant with war. Benjamin Franklin wanted all farmers, fishermen, and merchants free to go about their business in time of war. John Adams agreed. The American ministers in France wrote the Comte de Vergennes, the French foreign minister, that if powers at war were permitted any liberty, then "all the horrors of the barbarous ages may be introduced and justified." Hamilton, perhaps because of his conservative temperament, was appalled by random seizures of civilian goods. After all, those protesting the Writs of Assistance and the many parliamentary taxation measures had been arguing on behalf of private property. When Congress issued letters of marque and reprisal, it wanted proper rules observed and private property which did not qualify for seizure protected. The privateering commission adopted 2 May 1780 cautioned that all captured items were subject to legal adjudication. Contraband was defined specifically as articles of warfare. Ships from Bermuda were exempt from capture until 1 May 1781. As late as 26 February 1782, Congress resolved that European ships were not liable for capture merely because they had British goods in their holds.³³

In the land war, George Washington tried continually to enforce orders against looting and insure that prisoners were well treated. Both sides perpetrated atrocities, especially in the savage frontier warfare, and each destroyed supplies it thought the other might use. But a lack of success cannot be mistaken for cynical lack of concern. Washington ruefully observed that American troops looted their own people more than the enemy did, to the enemy's obvious advantage. When a general cartel for prisoner exchange was under negotiation between Washington's headquarters and British representatives, the Americans argued that all not bearing arms — medical personnel, chaplains, auditors, clothiers, the Commissary general of prisoners and his deputies, the Provost Marshall and his corps, all sutlers, and all servants — be exempt from capture and exchange. John Jay wanted war against only those Britons who were armed enemies. Thomas Jefferson's intense anger with the Indians during the Revolution stemmed as much from their wanton attacks on civilians as from their barbarity.³⁴ Even colonial pacifists found themselves

dians during the Revolution stemmed as much from their wanton attacks on civilians as from their barbarity.³⁴ Even colonial pacifists found themselves largely unmolested, although suspected of British sympathies and forced to pay special taxes.³⁵

Some civilians did carry on business as usual, despite the war, and much to the chagrin of Congress. It was customary in the eighteenth century to deny trade with the enemy, although special dispensations were allowed. During the colonial period, American trade with the enemy had been notorious, and this practice continued despite Congressional injunctions against exchange with the British. Money from the French loans even went to pay for forbidden imports.³⁶ The eighteenth-century view suggested that warfare interfere as little as possible with normal activity, but this went beyond the pale.

Americans reflected more conventional views regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. This was one area where men of the eighteenth century believed that they had made considerable progress. Although maltreatment can be uncovered, prisoners were seldom abused by either side during the Revolution.³⁷ Still, charges flew back and forth, and the British do seem to have been more guilty of brutality than the Americans, although certainly not as a result of high policy. Congress threatened, but did not practise retaliation for this. Thomas Gage refuted American charges with a remark that epitomized the view of warfare during this age: "to the glory of civilized Nations, humanity and war have become compatible, and compassion to the subdued is become almost a general system." Washington also believed in this, and argued frequently that proper treatment of British prisoners was both prudent and humane. Jefferson wrote to Patrick Henry that:

It is for the benefit of mankind to mitigate the horrors of war as much as possible. The practice therefore of modern nations treating captive enemies with politeness and generosity is not only delightful in contemplation but really interesting to all the world, friends, foes and neutrals.³⁸

Jefferson had few qualms about throwing the supposed scalp-buyer Henry Hamilton into irons on reputation alone, but the Virginia Council eventually ordered Hamilton released. It delivered a mild rebuke to Governor Jefferson by noting that the outcome of the war would not be affected by wreaking vengeance on captives. After the defeat of the British at Saratoga, Washington wrote General John Burgoyne a compassionate letter of consolation as a sympathetic brother-in-arms. Alexander Hamilton thought that even retaliation for outrages actually committed was "intirely repugnant to the genius of the age we live in." John Adams too wanted prisoners well-treated, but he was prepared to condone retaliation for brutality if that proved the only way to wring respect from the enemy. James Madison thought that men fighting for their country needed the protection of retaliation to deter enemy barbarity. In 1781 he chaired a con-

gressional committee on reprisal. The committee's report noted that to tolerate British inhumanity further would be

... inconsistent with the dignity of the United States, with the just expectations of the people thereof, and with the respect due to the benevolent rules by which Civilized nations have tempered the severities & evils of war . . .³⁹

Resolves on reprisal had passed Congress before, but nothing had come of these, and the Americans refused to adopt retaliation as policy, despite what they saw as severe provocation by the British. Even the spy, Major André, was well treated. Washington specifically ordered that while André was "not intitled to the usual indulgencies of the common prisoners of war," this did not mean that he could be insulted. Needless to say, the Americans were furious with Benedict Arnold, and when Arnold led an invading force into Virginia in 1780-1781, Jefferson, who was still governor, dallied with a scheme to kidnap the turncoat so that he could be tried and hanged. But the terms of the Saratoga surrender were remarkably generous, and in general, a word of honour was sufficient to secure a parole, at least for officers. This worked two ways, however, since Congress expected that members of the Convention Army away on parole would return if recalled because of the imprisonment of Henry Laurens in the Tower of London as a traitor.⁴⁰

The view of civilian involvement in war and the lenient treatment of prisoners fitted with another important piece of the limited-war mentality. War was to redress grievances, not for revenge. Daniel Shute noted in his sermon of 1767 that once conquered, enemies could not be justly treated in any spirit of vengeance. John Carmichael warned that the legal action of a just war did not warrant illegal methods of prosecution. Armies had been raised to defend the rights of the people, and once this was accomplished, Americans were expected to lay the sword aside and restore friendship with their former enemies. Even Zabdiel Adams, despite his evident weakness for heady tirades against the British, shared such an outlook. Edmund Pendleton argued that there was no need to take revenge on Tory refugees in New York, no matter how much the people of New Jersey had suffered from the war. Some hardship was expected, and it could not condone vengeance.⁴¹

Bursts of anger were evident nonetheless, such admirable restraint notwithstanding. The admittedly predatory war waged by the British along the American coasts produced a "Burning Report" 2 August 1776, written by Gouverneur Morris. Since Parliament had defended these burnings of coastal towns in Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia, Congress should burn London and other British towns. Then, it should declare that this had been done because Americans were prepared to meet their enemies in whatever kind of war they chose to wage. Over later British outrages, John Mathews moved that

... we shall conceive ourselves to be fully justified by the laws of self defence and sound policy to employ persons to reduce to ashes the towns of Great Britain as a just retaliation for the wanton acts of cruelty committed by the enemy and as a duty we owe our constituents.⁴²

As with retaliation for the maltreatment of prisoners, nothing much came of this. John Paul Jones did launch some minor pinpricks against English coastal villages, but the Americans did not make any systematic attempt to engage in reprisals. Apart from self-restraint, they lacked the ability.

The attitude towards the Loyalists was mixed when it came to revenge. Despite official generosity on the part of Congress, Maryland taxed Loyalists at three times the regular rate. Massachusetts prohibited their return. Elbridge Gerry wanted the Loyalists exported because bonds were not good enough, jails not large enough, and the Loyalists themselves not worth hanging. William Whipple raged that "such wretched miscreants" were permitted to remain among Americans. The Virginia delegates to Congress were instructed to argue for confiscation of Loyalists' estates because Loyalists had violated their rights by siding with tyranny. A crusading tendency did emerge with this issue, but some Americans also wanted clear proof before resorting to punishment of any kind. John Adams summed up the broad spirit well:

In a time of War, and especially a War like this, one may see the Necessity and Utility of the divine Prohibitions of Revenge, and the Injunctions of forgiveness of Injuries and love of Enemies, which We find in the Christian Religion. Unrestrained, in some degree by these benevolent Laws, Men would be Devils, at such a time as this.⁴³

Adams and others seem to have attempted such restraint. When he called for hard blows against the British, he meant seizing merchant ships and attacking men-of-war. He did not want the elimination of British power. John Jay remained benevolently disposed toward Britain throughout the war. Even over the Loyalists, Jay believed that each had chosen according to the best lights of his conscience and could not be held culpable for honest convictions. He hoped there would be no spirit of vengeance after the war. Arthur Lee thought that persecuting the Loyalists would only create martyrs, hold Americans up as a "vindictive persecuting People," and swell the population of Nova Scotia.⁴⁴ Of course the Loyalists did suffer, and bitter feelings worked against moderation on the local level, where the provisions of any Anglo-American agreement were ultimately applied.

American leaders took their country's honour seriously, consistent with the gentlemanly codes inherent in the limited-war mentality. The American ministers overseas had been assisting as best they could captive sailors escaping from Britain. But when the ministers learned that a general cartel for exchange was imminent, they issued a circular which stated that continued assistance contradicted American honour. A word of bond given to the enemy would perforce be kept. Admittedly, prudence and policy could motivate such a view. But Alexander Hamilton thought that any breach of faith in prisoner exchange would rebound against America's good name. Washington was especially sensitive on this point. When a British ship and crew were captured while under a flag of truce, he ordered them released to "remove from our Army every, the smallest Imputation

of an Infringement on the sacred dignity of a Flag." If reports about firing on other British flags proved correct, he wanted a proper apology made to General Howe and steps taken to insure that such incidents would not recur. American officers violating their paroles were to be forced to return home because "we have pledged ourselves to the enemy," Washington stated, and if the violators refused to obey, then "we cannot but consent that 14 officers of Convention . . . should be considered as free from every Obligation of Parole . . ." ⁴⁵

Washington was serious about this. Apart from his personal sense of honour, he consciously adhered to the civilized canons of his day when even enemy officers were expected to treat one another like gentlemen. Ends did not justify means. Certainly this reflected the injection of humane moral ideals into warfare. On the other hand, the Americans had no monopoly of such views. In several ways they seem to have possessed the sense of restraint which was integral to the limited-war mentality and vital to its success.

A third major facet of this mentality was the belief that war was an instrument of policy. On the whole, statesmen in the eighteenth century saw war as Clausewitz later insisted it must be seen, as an extension of the policy of the country. During the age of the American Revolution, such policy was still closely identified with the monarch, but largely because most western states were monarchies. Protection of the state, its citizens, its values, and furthering its interests were the primary functions of war. The statesmen of the time calculated their usage of arms as coolly as Bismarck did a century later. There was a marked absence of romantic-ideological enthusiasm, such as characterized the wars of Religion, the French Revolution, or the massive struggles of the twentieth century.

War had become an established institution during the middle ages, and linked with the nation-states which emerged following the Renaissance. By the time of the *Ancien Régime*, as Albert Sorel observed, "war was the great instrument of rule, the supreme argument of the reason of state." Statesmen conducted affairs as though the international world were a Hobbesian jungle of all against all. A state's ability in war reflected its cohesion, wealth, the glory of its prince, the strength of its institutions, and the ability of its rulers. War was a means of display, and a path to riches, power, and prestige, for individuals as well as the state and the prince. But despite all its gaudy trappings, war retained its essential function, protection. In addition, rulers and statesmen accepted a balance of power system, so that survival was not synonymous with the obliteration of the enemy. ⁴⁶

Americans did not embrace all these tenets of international politics and the views of individuals may well have varied according to their perception of the role and powers of the central government. But few arguments can be unearthed for having the war power at the state level and many seem to have accepted the fundamental notion that war was an instrument of national policy. Even Tom Paine, one of the most ethereal of republican enthusiasts, pointed out that occasionally, war was a country's best policy. John Adams, his puritanism tempered by his experiences as a diplomat in the courts of Europe, saw much original sin at

work in international affairs. But he also recognized the need for a delicate balance of power based upon the mutual self-interest of states. Sam Adams knew that other powers would assist America only if it were in their interests to do so. Hamilton realized how states used war as an instrument to further their interests.⁴⁷ Madison was more idealistic in his hopes, but he had a similar understanding. Washington was happy to have France as an ally, but he cautioned that it was "a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest." America's foreign representatives were instructed by Congress to appeal to France's self-interest when wooing support before 1778. If necessary, they were even to offer France any British West Indian islands which were captured during the course of the war.⁴⁸

Americans also saw the need for centralized control of the war effort. As early as 1776, Governor Nicholas Cooke of Rhode Island thought that all ideas of individual defence should be abandoned, since "there must be a supreme, superintending power, to exert and direct the force of the whole, for the defence and safety of all . . ." Such a view was reflected in the war power given Congress by the Articles of Confederation. Thomas Burke argued that "no one can be defended from the evils of war but by the united force of all." States could not be neutral unless Congress embarked on an offensive war of conquest. When the British Carlisle Commission arrived in America to try and stop the war, Congress was the only agency with full powers in war and peace, and by that time, independence had become a non-negotiable objective. Congress commissioned almost all the privateers sent out from America. Virginia ratified the French treaties less to insist upon states' rights than to demonstrate that those treaties bound her too.⁴⁹ Despite squabbles with the states over relative powers, Congress embodied the war and peace making abilities of the American people.

Washington realized that if the war power were not firmly vested with the central authority, then even the war for independence could become an "impossibility." He and other generals saw first hand the tremendous problems of divided and hamstrung authority during the war. When he came to Congress as a Virginia delegate, Madison was shocked to learn that the states had been violating central prerogatives. In 1782, for example, Pennsylvania seized goods bound for British prisoners under a congressional passport. Members of Congress made a blistering response, but the nature of the Confederation rendered them impotent, apart from verbal harangues and persuasion, to do much about this usurpation of their apparently constitutional authority. One member noted that control of war was "the most essential of all the powers delegated to Congress." Some went on to argue for stronger taxing authority as a concomitant.⁵⁰

All this concern, particularly in light of the nationalist movement which began to coalesce in Congress after 1780, suggests strongly that American leaders saw war as an instrument of the whole nation, and therefore as an instrument of state policy. While they thought largely in defensive terms, and professed to eschew the idea of offensive war, this does not preclude such a perception of the

function of armed force. There is no contradiction between seeing war as an extension of policy and having a defensive attitude. Even the idea of defence can be sufficiently elastic to allow for preventive strikes against a threatening enemy. This was no less true in the eighteenth century than in the twentieth.

Certainly the American leaders realized that war was essential for the success of their first enterprise as a self-professed nation-state. Survival and security must be the twin goals of any state policy. Independence was the first truly American policy objective when a redress of grievances was refused. Once established, independence was secured by the policy of political isolationism, but even this did not deny that war could be an instrument of policy. It merely argued neutrality as the most prudent course to follow.⁵¹ Robert Morris thought it terrible that American safety should necessitate dragging other powers into war but he was prepared to accept it. He asked if morality and policy were not related, and answered himself by stating: "Perhaps it may not be good Policy to investigate the Question at this time." John Dickinson, in draughting instructions for negotiating peace in 1779, suggested that the fisheries would be just compensation for the "expences and Damages of an unprovoked defensive war." Interest began to arise in the safety of the western lands adjacent to Spanish territory. In short, different sections of the country began to define specific interests once the goal of independence seemed relatively secure.⁵² Subsequently, American statesmen used or threatened war with Spain, France, and England, when circumstances warranted. Moralism, idealism, even a belief that free trade could lead to peace did not contradict such a view as questions of national interest and national pride began to render reasoned definitions of self-defence increasingly difficult.

Finally, in common with so many other statesmen and thinkers of the age, many American leaders viewed war as a part of the nature of man, or at least the ambivalent nature of man as it was expressed through organized societies. In large measure, the eighteenth-century thinkers saw man as a mixture of conflicting good and evil tendencies. Optimism and pessimism were therefore functionally related in their expectations of future development. These men were also doubtful about the eradication of war. The thinkers certainly condemned war as irrational, contrary to progress, and unprofitable. But Peter Gay once commented that hatred of war during this age really was little more than a "respectable sentiment," and was only a way of condemning monarchs. Most thinkers accepted war as a part of nature and even saw positive functions for the employment of force.⁵³ For Hugo Grotius, "so far from anything in the principles of nature being repugnant to war, every part of them indeed rather favours it." Thomas Hobbes argued that "the condition of man (. . .) is a condition of war," since self-defence was a first law of nature in a predatory world.⁵⁴ Spinoza thought that self-preservation was man's basic task. Nature was a state of war and only prudence dictated restraint. David Hume agreed and Voltaire commented with disgust: "war is an inevitable scourge. If we take notice, all men have worshipped Mars." Montesquieu focussed less on man in a state of nature than on man in society, as did Jean Jacques Rousseau, but both still saw war as a

necessary part of the human condition, whatever hopes might exist for the future.⁵⁵

Even the peace proposals were more pacific than pacifist. The schemes of the Renaissance had unblushingly defined universal peace as a universal monarchy to wage more effective wars against the infidel. The Duc de Sully's seventeenth-century "Grand Design" wanted French hegemony and the destruction of Austrian power to insure peace. By the time of the age of limited wars, peace plans had to cope with the multiple-state system and they really resembled more efficient balance-of-power schemes than genuine peace plans. Most relied upon deterrence to keep recalcitrant princes in line.⁵⁶ Most flailed at monarchs as the primary cause of war, and wanted to curb the power of the prince or erect republican governments as a pathway to peace. Although it seems tragically naive in retrospect, the idea that republicanism and peace were synonymous held considerable currency during the eighteenth century.⁵⁷

Identifiable American views of the origins of war coincided with these broader configurations. Jefferson thought that habit might have made men "honor force more than finesse," but he also knew that reason would not always move human affairs. Americans could only hope to avoid those wars produced by their own folly. For the remainder, they would perforce make the best preparations they could. Tom Paine believed that it was "the pride of kings which throws mankind into confusion." John Witherspoon, speaking on the Articles of Confederation, noted that republics had historically been pacific. Sam Adams predictably saw tyrants as the "Scourges and Plagues of Mankind," which extended the blame somewhat.⁵⁸ Hamilton was more penetrating. But even he found the passions of men "abundant sources of contention and hostility" among nations. The United States had been delivered into a predatory universe, where states were in perpetual antagonism. This could explode into war at any time. John Jay thought "that nations should make war against nations is less surprising than their living in uninterrupted peace and harmony." Benjamin Franklin expected that "the foolish part of mankind will make wars from time to time with each other," and believed that the rest should ease the general burden as much as possible. Madison, despite hopes for improvement, was similarly pessimistic.⁵⁹ Clearly, many of the Founding Fathers had severe doubts about the possibilities of peace among men.

John Adams and the clergy fixed upon original sin as the culprit. Adams saw the struggle against tyranny as a central part of man's history and believed that the whole world was liable for calamities as a result. Wars flowed from passions, such as the jealousy of states, and he cited Athens and Britain as the respective instigators of the Peloponnesian and Revolutionary wars as examples supporting his thesis. Human nature did not love war, but men still fought for "frivolous purposes of avarice, ambition, vanity, resentment, and revenge." Princes had more than their share of these sins, but America would be able to eschew all save defensive wars because of her republican institutions.⁶⁰ The clerics saw man wallowing in lust. War would remain as long as evil stalked a

degenerate world. American sins had combined with British depravity to bring condign punishment down upon American heads. To Quaker Anthony Benezet, sin and war were reciprocal partners which propelled man in an endless circle of misery. But ministers could also link war to monarchy and peace to republicanism, as Zabdiel Adams revealed in his Lexington commemorative sermon of 1783.⁶¹

The belief that states were predatory, that monarchs were prone to war, that man's passions lay at the heart of misery in the human condition all combined to produce in the minds of many American leaders a conviction that war was to some degree inevitable. This was why arguments arose for greater unity; the United States would face danger in the future and must be prepared. Washington and Hamilton clearly reflected such a belief in their thoughts on a peacetime military establishment for the United States. "It is no new maxim in politics," Washington wrote, "that for a nation to obtain Peace, or insure it, It must be prepared for war." Weakness invited aggression and potential predators lurked everywhere. Even a war in geographically remote Europe could become a vortex which would suck America in to destruction. Hamilton, Madison, Oliver Ellsworth, James Wilson, and Samuel Holton prepared a report on a peace-time military. This embodied Washington's specific recommendations and revealed at the same time the conviction that war must be anticipated in human affairs, at least for the moment. Thus a limited preparedness was essential. This had to be comprehensive and under congressional control. Regular troops, engineers, uniform militia regulations, and frontier and seacoast fortifications should be complemented by arms manufactories because "every country ought to endeavour to have within itself all the means essential to its own preservation . . ."⁶² Although an argument for military autarchy, this was of course no call for a nation in arms. Such a policy would have conformed neither with American resources nor American needs. But it was consonant with what the members of the committee believed America would require in the near future and with what Americans would stand for in light of their republican views and fears of military power under central authority.

This was why so many thought that isolationism was the most prudent policy. Some had feared that the terms of the Franco-American treaties would bind America to France's future wars. This was no idle fancy, as events of the 1790s revealed. Apart from that, independent predators could also pose threats. John Jay thought that "we shall always find well appointed armies to be our ablest negotiators." Virtue and knowledge were essential for liberty and union, he told William Greene, but arms would allow these to flourish by deterring others from attack. Madison too thought that war was sometimes the best coin to purchase peace. John Adams advised his son John Quincy early in the Revolution to study diligently and prepare for the future councils, negotiations, and wars of his country. Adams knew they would come, as did Franklin, who was certain that the world had not yet reached the idyllic state where nations could disband their armies and expect to live in peace.⁶³ Do what they might, organize their society as they might, Americans had to expect war in the future.

These were the thoughts which shaped the texture of the American view of war during the Revolutionary years. It had firm foundations in classical theories, English whig ideas, and the probings and reflections of many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century minds. True to their age, the Founding Fathers had a mixed view of human nature and expected the future to be much like the past, at least when it came to men's affairs. History did not make them overly sanguine about imminent peace among nations. They wanted a happy future but they knew better than to place excessive reliance upon wishful thinking. Their optimism was guarded at best. To be fair, so was their pessimism. This was why they could avoid despair. War was a scourge, but it might be tempered and constricted, if not eliminated, and thus its worst abuses softened.⁶⁴

In these important ways, the Founding Fathers accepted the limited-war mentality of the eighteenth century. It can therefore serve as a starting point for the American view of war which developed following the struggle for independence. It also suggests that our current understanding of the American view of war needs refinement. A closer investigation of American thinking about the use of force in international relations may even reshape our appreciation of the significance of war in American history.

NOTES

*The author would like to thank the Senate Research Committee of the University of Prince Edward Island for its financial aid.

¹Dexter Perkins, "The American Attitude Towards War," *Yale Review*, 38 (1948), pp. 234-252; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* (Cambridge Mass., 1957), pp. 148-153; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York, 1957), p. 34; Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 44-114; Paul Varg, *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers* (East Lansing, 1963), pp. 2-5; Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans: The Colonial Experience* (Chicago, 1958), pp. 345-372; Howard Peckham, *The Colonial Wars 1689-1762* (Chicago, 1964), chap. xi; John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 1 (1971), pp. 205-228; Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and Practice 1763-1789* (New York, 1971), chap. i; Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York, 1971), pp. xii-xiii, 18-19, 47.

²Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago, 1957), chap. i; Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), pp. 11-12; John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 4th ed. rev. (New York, 1971), chap. i. Merlo J. Pusey, *The Way we Go to War* (Boston, 1971), pp. 41-58, identifies an early period of limited war under the Federalists and Thomas Jefferson.

³Osgood, *Limited War*, pp. 61-87; Hans Speier, "Militarism in the Eighteenth Century," in *Social Order and the Risks of War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 230-252; John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1963), pp. 182-267; Roland Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace* (New York, 1960), pp. 174-182. Some useful comments appear in M. Bernard, "The Growth of Laws and Usages of War," *Oxford Essays*, 2 (1856), pp. 102-104.

⁴M. H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965), p. 189, writes: "No one, in the middle ages, believed that war among Christians ought to be total war. Its extent was limited by its legal purpose, to establish right by appeal to divine judgment, and it should not disrupt the unity of Christian society." For the development of the just-war idea see Bainton, *Christian Attitudes*, pp. 17-135; Brian Bond "The 'Just War' in Historical Perspective," *History Today*, 16 (1966), pp. 111-119; Joachim von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, 33 (1939), pp. 665-688; William B. Ballis, *The Legal Position of War: Changes in its Practise and Theory from Plato to Vattel* (The Hague, 1937), pp. 40-104; Donald A. Wells, *The War Myth* (New York, 1967), pp. 32-48.

⁵Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, trans. A. C. Campbell (New York, 1901), p. 317. See *ibid.*, pp. 76, 83, 245, 249.

⁶Emerich de Vattel, *The Laws of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns*, trans. Charles G. Fenwick (Washington, D. C., 1916), was the major authority by the mid-eighteenth century. See Fenwick, "The Authority of Vattel," *American Political Science Review*, 7 (1913), pp. 395-410. Frederick the Great wrote: "That war is virtuous which is waged in order to maintain the authority of the state, preserve its security, aid allies, or check an ambitious prince who plots conquests contrary to your interests . . ." Jay Luvaas, ed. and trans., *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (New York, 1966), p. 44.

⁷Good introductions to this subject are Geoffrey Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism 1618-1763* (New York, 1973), pp. 1-33 and Albert Sorel, *Europe Under the Old Regime*, trans. Francis Herrich (New York, 1964), p. 18. For contemporary statements see John Locke, *Concerning Civil Government: Second Essay* (Chicago, 1952), III, 19, p. 29; XII, 145, pp. 58-59; III, 20, pp. 19-29. Richard Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 79, 104-105, 154-158; William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of Public Wrongs* (Boston, 1962), IV, pp. 62-66; Edwin Canaan, ed., *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms delivered in the University of Glasgow by Adam Smith*, reported by a student in 1763 (Oxford, 1896), p. 266. Declarations of war were few. See J. F. Maurice, *Hostilities Without Declaration of War* (London, 1883), pp. 12-23.

⁸Educated Americans were astonishingly well-read and eclectic. Clinton Rossiter, *The Political Thought of the American Revolution* (New York, 1963), originally published as *Seedtime of the Republic*, Part III (1952); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); H. Trevor Colbourn, *The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1965). Useful older works are Benjamin Wright, *American Interpretations of Natural Law: A Study in the Historical Process of Political Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1931); Charles Mullett, *Fundamental Law and the American Revolution, 1760-1776* (New York, 1933); James J. Walsh, *Education of the Founding Fathers of the Republic: Scholasticism in the Colonial College* (New York, 1935). For an indication of the breadth of reading of one Founding Father, see James Madison, "Report on Books for Congress, 23 Jan. 1783," in William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal, eds., *The Papers of James Madison* (Chicago, 1962- , 8 vols. to date), VI, pp. 63-115, *passim*. (Hereafter cited as JM, *Papers*).

⁹Mason, *The British American*, No. IX, Williamsburg, 28 July 1774, in Peter Force, ed., *American Archives* (Washington, D. C., 1837), Fourth Series, I, p. 653. (Hereafter cited as *American Archives*). To the Virginia Convention, 28 July 1774, *ibid.*, p. 647.

¹⁰Gadsden cited in L. H. Butterfield, ed., *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961, 4 vols.), II, p. 139 (Hereafter cited as JA, *Diary*). Hamilton, "Full Vindication," 15 Dec. 1774, Harold C. Syrett, ed., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton* (New York, 1960- , 9 vols. to date), I, p. 51. (Hereafter cited as AH, *Papers*).

Gerald Stourzh, *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government* (Stanford, 1970), chap. I, stresses the European background of Hamilton's thought.

¹¹Jefferson, "Draught," July 1774, Julian P. Boyd, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (Princeton, 1950- , 19 vols to date), I, p. 133. (Hereafter cited as TJ, *Papers*). A letter to Canadians from Congress, 26 Oct. 1774, did not specifically ask for violence. Worthington C. Ford, ed., *Journals of the Continental Congress* (Washington, D. C., 1904-1937, 34 vols.), I, pp. 105-113. (Hereafter cited as JCC.)

¹²Adams to Abigail Adams, 7 July 1775, L. H. Butterfield, ed., *Adams Family Correspondence 1761-1782* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963, 4 vols.), I, p. 241. (Hereafter cited as Adams, *Correspondence*). Letter to Canada, JCC, II, pp. 68-69. Madison, 9 May 1775, JM, *Papers*, I, pp. 147. For other views of John Adams, see to Abigail Adams, 2, 8 May 1775, *ibid.*, p. 254; 7 Oct. 1775, *ibid.*, p. 296; 29 May 1775, *ibid.*, p. 207; 10 June 1775, *ibid.*, pp. 213-214; to Henry Knox, 2 June 1776, Charles Francis Adams, ed., *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1850-1856, 10 vols.), IX, p. 385; to Zabdiel Adams, 21 June 1776, *ibid.*, p. 400. (Hereafter cited as JA, *Works*). For more on Adams' views, see John J. Kelly, Jr., "The Struggle for American Seaborne Independence as Viewed by John Adams" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine, 1973), chap. i.

¹³For Hostile Acts Committee, see John Adams to James Warren, 19 Oct. 1775, Edmund C. Burnett, ed., *Letters of Members of Continental Congress* (Washington, D. C., 1921, 8 vols.), I, p. 235. See also *ibid.*, pp. 234, 238 (Hereafter cited as *Letters*). On stores seizure, see JCC, II, p. 70; for Fast Day Invocation, *ibid.*, p. 181; for address to Six Nations, *ibid.*, p. 181, for address to Ireland, 28 July 1775, *ibid.*, p. 218.

¹⁴Allegiance to Crowned Heads Upon the British Throne, 19 Oct. 1775, *American Archives*, III, pp. 1106-1107. See also "8,000 Inhabitants," 26 Apr. 1775, *ibid.*, II, pp. 399; "New Hampshire Oath of Military Service," 6 June 1775, *ibid.*, p. 658; "An American to the Americans," 1 June 1775 (Salem), *ibid.*, p. 875. For Chew, *The Lawfulness of Defence Against an Armed Enemy*, (Philadelphia, 1775), see Evans No. 18867 in Clifford K. Shipton, ed., *Early American Imprints* (Worcester, Mass.). These are organized according to Charles Evans, *American Bibliography 1639-1820* (Chicago, 1903, 20 vols. plus supplements). Subsequent citations from this collection will quote only the Evans numbers Frank L. Mott, "The Newspaper Coverage of Lexington and Concord," *New England Quarterly*, 17 (1944), pp. 489-505.

¹⁵Paine, "Thoughts," July 1775, M. D. Conway, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Paine* (New York, 1964, 4 vols.), I, pp. 55-58; "Common Sense," *ibid.*, p. 118 (Hereafter cited as TP, *Writings*). On the Declaration on Taking Up Arms, see TJ, *Papers*, I, pp. 187-217; and Julian P. Boyd, "The Disputed Authorship of the Declaration on the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, 1775," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 74 (1950), pp. 51-73. Joseph Hewes considered this a "manifesto or declaration of War." To Samuel Johnston, 8 July 1775, *Letters*, I, p. 160.

¹⁶Washington, "To Canada," John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington, D. C., 1931-1944, 39 vols.), III, pp. 478-480, and "General Orders," 2 July 1776, *ibid.*, V, p. 211 (Hereafter cited as GW, *Writings*). For Articles of War 30 June 1775, see JCC, II, p. 112; III, p. 331. *The Crisis*, XIV, pp. 113-119, Evans No. 13978. R. H. Lee to Landon Carter, 2 June 1776, *Letters*, I, p. 469. John Adams to James Warren, 19 Sept. 1775, *ibid.*, p. 200. William Ellery to Ezra Stiles, 20 July 1776, *ibid.*, II, p. 18. Also for John Adams see *Diary*, II, p. 236, III, pp. 351-352; Millis, *Arms and Men*, pp. 22-23; Rossiter, *Political Thought*, pp. 140-145.

¹⁷Morris to Joseph Reed, 21 July 1776, *Letters*, II, p. 19. Rossiter, *Political Thought*, pp. 33, 110, chap. ix. The reaction to "Common Sense" indicated this shift of allegiance. Winthrop D. Jordan, "Familial Politics: Thomas Paine and the Killing of the King, 1776," *Journal of American History*, 60 (1973) pp. 294-308; David F. Hawke, *Paine*

(New York, 1974), pp. 44-151.

¹⁸Alice Baldwin, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution* (Durham, 1928); Charles W. Akers, *Called Unto Liberty: A Life of Jonathan Mayhew 1720-1766* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); Alan Heimert, *Religion and the American Mind from the Great Awakening to the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966); Nathan O. Hatch, "The Origins of Civil Millennialism in America: New England Clergymen, the War with France, and the Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d series, 31 (1974), pp. 407-430.

¹⁹Daniel Shute, *A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company* (Boston, 1767), pp. 20, 27, 28, Evans No. 10768. Samuel Stillman, *A Sermon* (Boston, 1770), pp. 5-6, 26, Evans No. 11872. Jeremy Belknap, *A Sermon on Military Duty* (Salem, 1773), pp. 7, 20, 23-24, Evans No. 12667. See also Eli Forbes, *The Dignity and Importance of the Military Character Illustrated* (Boston, 1771), p. 13, Evans No. 12044; Nathaniel Robbins, *Jerusalem's Peace Wished* (Boston, 1772), pp. 12-17, Evans No. 12545; Simeon Howard, *A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company* (Boston, 1773), pp. 7-9, 13-14, 19, Evans No. 12813; Elisha Fish, *The Art of War Lawful* (Boston, 1774), pp. 7-9, 14, Evans No. 13276; John Lathrop, *A Sermon* (Boston, 1774), pp. 23-24, 28-39, Evans No. 13371.

²⁰Zabdiel Adams, *The Grounds of Confidence and Success in War Represented* (Boston, 1775), pp. 25-27, Evans No. 13789. Daniel Batwell, *A Sermon Preached At Yorktown* (Philadelphia, 1775), p. 18, Evans No. 13828. See also John Carmichael, *A Self-Defensive War Lawful* (Philadelphia, 1775), pp. 6, 12-14, 21, 30, Evans No. 13862; David Jones, *Defensive War in a Just Cause Sinless* (Philadelphia, 1775), pp. 11-18, Evans No. 14133; Nathan Perkins, *A Sermon Preached to the Soldiers* (Hartford, 1775) pp. 7-9, Evans No. 14382; Samuel West, *A Sermon Preached Before the Honorable Council and the Honorable House of Representatives of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay*, in Peter N. Carroll, ed., *Religion and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 152, 155.

²¹Jacob Cushing, *Divine Judgment upon Tyrants* (Boston, 1778), p. 23, Evans No. 15776. Samuel Cooke, *A Sermon Preached at Lexington* (Boston, 1777), pp. 12, 23-27, Evans No. 15279. The just-war idea can gather momentum to become a crusade. Roland Bainton, "Congregationalism: From the Just War to the Crusade in the Puritan Revolution," *Andover Newton Theological School Bulletin*, 35 (1943), pp. 1-20. More apposite are Leonard J. Kramer, "Muskets in the Pulpit: 1776-1783," Presbyterian Historical Society, *Journal*, Part i in 31 (1953), pp. 229-244; Part ii in 32 (1954), pp. 37-51; Hatch, "Origins of Millennialism".

²²Abraham Kateltas, *God Arising and Pleading his People's Cause* (Boston, 1777), pp. 19-20, 27, Evans No. 15378; Samuel Woodward, *The Help of the Lord* (Boston, 1779), Evans No. 16885; Isaac Morrill, *Faith in Divine Providence* (Boston, 1780), pp. 14-16, 18-21, Evans No. 17807; Phillips Payson, *A Sermon Preached at Lexington* (Boston, 1782), pp. 10-11, Evans No. 17655.

²³Hamilton to Catherine Livingston, May 1777, AH, *Papers*, I, p. 260. See also Stourzh, *Hamilton*, p. 26, and Gilbert Lycan, *Alexander Hamilton and American Foreign Policy: A Design for Greatness* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1970), pp. 17-19, 46-47, 54-55. See also Hamilton to George Clinton, 1 June 1783, AH, *Papers*, III, p. 369. John Jay, "Address," 23 Dec. 1776, Henry P. Johnston, ed., *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 1763-1826* (New York, 1890-1893, 4 vols.), I, pp. 105, 110-116, 118 (Hereafter cited as JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*). See Jay to William Livingston, 22 Mar. 1777, and "Charge to the Grand Jury of Ulster County, New York," 20 Apr. 1777, *ibid.*, pp. 123, 159-160.

²⁴"Instructions to Virginia Delegates in re Confiscated Property," 17 Dec. 1782, in JM, *Papers*, V, p. 409. Washington to the Massachusetts Legislature, and General Orders,

9 July 1776, GW, *Writings*, V, pp. 239, 245; to John Washington, 13 May and 8 Dec. 1776, *ibid.*, pp. 91-93, *ibid.*, VI, pp. 398-399; to George Mason, 27 Mar. 1779, *ibid.*, XIV, pp. 299-300; to John Laurens, 15 Jan. 1781, *ibid.*, XXI, p. 110; to George Fairfax, 10 July 1783, *ibid.*, XXVII, p. 58.

²⁵Adams to Abigail Adams, 3 July 1776, Adams, *Correspondence*, II, p. 28; to same 11 July 1776, *ibid.*, p. 44; to Isaac Smith 1 June 1776, *ibid.*, p. 2; to Abigail Adams, 28 April 1777, *ibid.*, p. 227; 27 Dec. 1778, *ibid.*, III, p. 141; 18 Dec. 1781, *ibid.*, IV, p. 266; to Mr. Calkoen, 4 Oct., 1780, JA, *Works*, VII, pp. 269-273. Jay to Floridablanca, 25 Apr. 1780, JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*, I, pp. 287-289, 299.

²⁶"The Crisis," 2, 13 Jan. 1777, TP, *Writings*, I, pp. 190-192; "The Crisis," 5, Oct. 1777, *ibid.*, p. 249; "The Crisis," 7, 21 Nov. 1778, *ibid.*, p. 277; "The Crisis," 9, 6 Oct. 1780, *ibid.*, pp. 306-307; "The Crisis," 10, 5 March 1782, *ibid.*, p. 334.

²⁷A Moderate Whig, *Defensive Arms Vindicated and the Lawfulness of the American War Made Manifest* (Privately printed, 1783), pp. 11, 15, 19, 20-24, Evans No. 17905. See also David Humphreys, *The Glory of America; or Peace Triumphant Over War* (Philadelphia, 1783), Evans No. 17978; Levi Frisbie, *An Oration (. . .) on Account of the Happy Restoration of Peace* (Boston, 1783), Evans No. 17938; and *Letters*, VII, pp. 79-80, 85, 93ff. Americans considered the war won after the British surrender at Yorktown, but Congress dragged its feet over the peace as particular interests became important. See Richard B. Morris, *The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence* (New York, 1965), chap. xviii.

²⁸See note 4, above. On the balance of power idea: F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 153-185; Gilbert, *Farewell Address*, p. 89; R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, 1941), pp. 49-60; Sorel, *Europe*; Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire 1740-1763* (New York, 1940). On the limited-war mentality: Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military*, rev'd. ed. (New York, 1967), pp. 58, 66-68, 72; Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* (New York, 1969, 2 vols.), II, pp. 37-41; Richard Shelly Hartigan, "Non-combatant Immunity: Reflections on its Origins and Present Status," *Review of Politics*, 29 (1967), pp. 204-220; Count Saxe, *Reveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War* (Westport, 1971), pp. 93, 96, Luvaas, *Frederick*.

²⁹Grotius, *War and Peace*, pp. 323-334; Vattel, *Law of Nations*, pp. 280-291; Ballis, *Legal Position of War*; Sydney D. Bailey, *Prohibitions and Restraints in War* (London, 1972), pp. 31-34; Locke, *Second Essay*, XVI, 96, p. 70; Blackstone, *Commentaries*, IV, p. 62; Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, trans. Thomas Nugent (Chicago, 1952), I, 3, p. 3.

³⁰On this point see Milton Klein, "Failure of a Mission: The Drummond Peace Proposal of 1775," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 25 (1971-1972), pp. 343-380. John Ellis, *Armies In Revolution* (New York, 1974), chap. iii, argues that Americans never transcended localism to develop a crusade. The broad character of the war is explored in Higginbotham, *War of Independence*, but important also on this point are Weigley, *American Way of War*, chaps. i-ii, especially p. 13; Millis, *Arms and Men*, pp. 22-23; and John Shy, "The American Revolution; The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1973), pp. 121-156.

³¹On exporting the Revolution, see Higginbotham, *War of Independence*, pp. 106-115. A motion in Congress requesting Ireland to rebel was lost. John Fell, "Diary," 14 Aug. 1779, *Letters*, IV, p. 366. Canada was seen largely as a military target. Jonathan Gregory Rossie, *The Politics of Command in the American Revolution* (Syracuse, 1975),

pp. 32-33. See Adams to James Warren, 7 June 1775, *Letters*, I, 113, pp. 353-355; Philip Schuyler to Lieutenant Governor of New York, 29 Jan. 1780, and John Sullivan, Proposed Address, 2 May 1781, *ibid.*, VI, pp. 20-21, 75-76. James Varnum proposed to conquer Bermuda, but only for military purposes. See to Washington, 2 Oct. 1781, *ibid.*, VI, p. 230. 24 Jan. 1776, *JCC*, IV, pp. 85-86, Congress promised to liberate the Canadians from tyranny. William Ellery to William Whipple, 31 May 1778, *Letters*, III, p. 269.

³²For propaganda see Philip Foner, *Morale Education in the American Army* (New York, 1944), pp. 9-24; Allen Bowman, *The Morale of the Revolutionary Army* (Port Washington, N. Y., 1964), pp. 97-102; Philip Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763-1783* (Chapel Hill, 1941), pp. 365-384; John D. Stoudt, "The Poetry of the American Revolution: A Preliminary Study," *Bulletin of the Historical Society of Montgomery County* (1958), p. 108. William Stinchcomb, *The American Revolution and the French Alliance* (Syracuse, 1969), pp. 10-12, 14-31; Gilbert, *Farwell Address*; and Varg, *Policies of Fathers*, tend to stress American idealism. Recent research is beginning to tell us more about the non-martial aspects of the war. See John Shy's work in particular, and the trends discussed by Higginbotham in "American Historians and the Military History of the American Revolution," *American Historical Review*, 70 (1964), pp. 18-34.

³³Richard Smith, "Diary," 13, 18 March 1776, *Letters*, I, pp. 386, 398. For privateer commissions see *JCC*, XVI, pp. 403-404; the bond required of masters, *ibid.*, pp. 405-406; the instructions to masters, *ibid.*, pp. 407-408, and *ibid.*, XVIII, pp. 1097-1098. See also "Instructions to Privateers, 7 Apr. 1781, *ibid.*, XIX, pp. 361-363. On captures, 26 Feb. 1782, *ibid.*, XXII, pp. 99-100; The "Free ships, free goods" doctrine did find early expression in the plan for a treaty with France. 18 July 1776, *ibid.*, V, pp. 585-586.

³⁴Benjamin Franklin, "On War and Peace," *Old South Leaflets* (New York, n. d.), VII, pp. 1, 2-3, 5; American Commissioners to Vergennes, 1 Jan. 1779, JA, *Works*, VII, p. 74; JA, *Diary*, III, pp. 96, 115. Hamilton to George Clinton, 22 Dec. 1777, AH, *Papers*, I, p. 368; to Colonel Clement Biddle, 20 Aug. 1780, *ibid.*, II, pp. 380-381; "Draft of a Proposed Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War," 10-11 Apr. 1778, *ibid.*, I, pp. 466-472; Jefferson to John Page, 5 Aug. 1776, TJ *Papers*, I, pp. 485-486.

³⁵Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton, 1968), pp. 183-284; Roger E. Sappington, "North Carolina and the Non-Resistant Sects During the American War of Independence," *Quaker History*, 60 (1971), pp. 29-47.

³⁶Madison, "Motion for Complete Non-Intercourse with Great Britain," 16 Mar. 1781, JM, *Papers*, III, pp. 22-24; to Jefferson, 16 Apr. 1781, *ibid.*, p. 71; "Report on Illicit Trade with the Enemy," 19 June 1782, *ibid.*, IV, pp. 351-352; to Arthur Lee and to Edmund Pendleton, 25 June 1782, *ibid.*, pp. 368, 369. War was a business, as the enthusiasm for privateering suggests. Some states considered this trade treason, but laws did not stop it. James W. Hurst, *The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays* (Westport, 1971), pp. 94-96; Ludwell H. Johnson, "The Business of War: Trading with the Enemy in English and Early American Law," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 118 (1974), pp. 459-468. Illegal trade expanded as the war progressed. Randolph B. Campbell, "The Case of the 'Three Friends'," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 74 (1966), pp. 190-209. An overview can be found in R. G. Albion and J. B. Pope, *Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience* (New York, 1942), pp. 39-59.

³⁷The prisoners of the Revolution have received extended coverage. Charles H. Metzger, SJ, *The Prisoner in the American Revolution* (Chicago, 1971), is the most comprehensive. Good special studies are John K. Alexander, "American Privateersmen in the Mill Prison 1777-1782: An Evaluation," Essex Institute, *Historical Collections*, 102 (1966), pp. 318-340, and Alexander, "Forton Prison During the American Revolution: A Case Study of British Prisoner of War Policy and the American Prisoner Response to that

Policy," *ibid.*, 103 (1967), pp. 365-389; Richard H. Amerman, "Treatment of American Prisoners During the Revolution," New Jersey Historical Society, *Proceedings*, 78 (1960), pp. 257-275; Olive Anderson, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in Britain During the American War of Independence," Institute of Historical Research, *Bulletin*, 28 (1955), pp. 63-83; and William Dabney, *After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army* (Albuquerque, 1954).

³⁸Jefferson to Henry, 27 Mar. 1779, TJ, *Papers*, II, p. 242. See also to R. H. Lee, 21 Apr. 1779, *ibid.*, p. 255; to Theodorick Bland, 8 June 1779, *ibid.*, p. 286-287; Adrienne Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1943), pp. 19-20, 30. Gage to Washington, 23 Nov. 1777, Jared Sparks, ed., *Correspondence of the American Revolution* (Freeport, 1970, 4 vols.), II, p. 48. Washington to Hartford Committee of Safety, 26 Sept. 1775, GW, *Writings*, III, p. 519; to Thomas Gage, 11 and 20 Aug. 1775, *ibid.*, pp. 416-417, 430-431. See also Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, 5 Aug. 1777, *Letters*, II, p. 438; Thomas Burke, "Abstract of Debates," 14 Mar. 1777, *ibid.*, p. 299; Canaan, *Lectures of Smith*, pp. 266-274.

³⁹Madison, "Report on Retaliation Against the British," 1 Oct. 1781, JM, *Papers*, III, pp. 271-272. See also *ibid.*, 273, n. 7. "Advice of Council Respecting Henry Hamilton and Others," 29 Sept. 1779, TJ, *Papers*, III, pp. 94-95; Jefferson to George Washington, 2 Oct. 1779, *ibid.*, p. 99; to George Matthews, 8 Oct. 1779, *ibid.*, pp. 101-103; Jay to James DeLancey, 2 Jan. 1778, JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*, I, pp. 171-172; Adams to Abigail Adams, 2 June 1777, Adams, *Correspondence*, II, p. 253; 19 Aug. 1777, *ibid.*, p. 319; Hamilton to Henry Knox, 7 June 1782, AH, *Papers*, III, pp. 91-92. See also John Hancock to Washington, 13 July 1776, *Letters*, II, p. 9. John Witherspoon hoped that the terms of the Saratoga Convention would not be broken, regardless of British actions. Speech, 2 Jan. 1778, *ibid.*, III, pp. 5-9. Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, 5 Aug. 1777, *ibid.*, II, p. 438; President of Congress to Washington, 17 March 1777, *ibid.*, p. 302; same to President of Pennsylvania, 7 Aug. 1781, *ibid.*, VI, p. 169. For Congressional resolves on retaliation see 21 Jan. 1778, JCC, X, p. 80; "Retaliation Report," 11 June 1781, *ibid.*, XX, pp. 620-622; 20 Sept. 1781, *ibid.*, XXI, pp. 968-977.

⁴⁰Washington to William Howe, 18 Dec. 1775, GW, *Writings*, IV, p. 171; to the President of Congress, 15 July 1776, *ibid.*, V, pp. 279-280; to Robert Morris *et al.*, 12 Jan. 1776, *ibid.*, p. 503; to Jefferson, 13 Sept., 1779, *ibid.*, XVI, p. 272. See especially Washington's views over the Huddy affair, *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 218-221, 305, 306, XXV, pp. 41, 358. See also to Patrick Henry, 13 Feb. 1779, *ibid.*, XIV, pp. 104-105; to Sir Henry Clinton, 14 Feb. 1779, *ibid.*, p. 107; on Major André see to John Jameson, 25 Sept. 1780, *ibid.*, XX, pp. 86-87. For other evidence see James Wilkinson to Washington, 24 Oct. 1777, Sparks, *Correspondence*, II, p. 14; William Heath to Washington, 25 Oct. 1777, *ibid.*, p. 17; Horatio Gates to Washington, 23 Nov. 1777, *ibid.*, p. 48. For the recall of Convention officers see President of Congress to Washington, 5 Apr. 1781, *Letters*, VI, p. 48. Favours were supposed to be mutual. "Resolve," 21 Aug. 1779, JCC, XIV, p. 985.

⁴¹Shute, *Thanksgiving Sermon*, p. 23; Fish, *War Lawful*, pp. 6, 14; Carmichael, *Self-Defensive War Lawful*, pp. 8, 16, 22, 24; Adams, *Evil Designs of Men*, pp. 23-24; Kramer, "Muskets in the Pulpit," II, p. 38. William Gordon to Hamilton, 25 Aug., 1779, AH, *Papers*, II, p. 143; Pendleton to Madison, 9 Sept. 1782, JM, *Papers*, V, p. 109-110.

⁴²20 Sept. 1781, JCC, XXI, pp. 977-978. "Burning Report," 2 Aug. 1779, *ibid.*, XIV, p. 916. A letter to France 22 Nov. 1780, accused the British of waging predatory war "regardless of their rank among civilized nations . . .", *ibid.*, XVIII, p. 1081. Washington rejected an invasion of Nova Scotia because that would be a "Measure of Conquest, rather than defence," and therefore "inconsistent with the General Principal upon which the Colonies have proceeded." To the Committee of the Massachusetts Legislature, 11 Aug. 1775, GW, *Writings*, III, p. 415; to John Banister, 21 Apr. 1778, *ibid.*, XI, pp. 289-290.

⁴³Adams to Abigail Adams, 14 Mar. 1777, Adams, *Correspondence*, II, p. 175. On Jefferson's scheme see TJ, *Papers*, IV, pp. 487-488; "Instructions to Virginia Delegates," 17 Dec. 1782, JM, *Papers*, V, pp. 409-410. Hamilton, "Draft of Cartel," 10-11 Apr. 1779, AH, *Papers*, I, pp. 466-472. On pardon for the loyalists see Henry Laurens to William Livingston, 27 Apr. 1778, *Letters*, III, p. 192. On discrimination see James Lovell to Richard Henry Lee, 5 Feb. 1778, *ibid.*, III, p. 71; Sam Adams to James Warren, 3 Nov. 1778, *ibid.*, p. 477; Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Hawley, 1 Jan. 1777, *ibid.*, II, p. 200; William Whipple to Ebenezer Thompson, 19 July 1779, *ibid.*, IV, p. 331; discussion in Congress 20 Aug. 1782, JCC, XXIII, pp. 479-480. A Committee on how the terms of the Treaty of Paris were to be applied argued for conciliation. 3 May 1783, *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 370-371.

⁴⁴Lee to James Monroe, 23 Aug. 1783, *Letters*, VII, 277. See also Stephen Higginson to Samuel Adams, 10 June 1783, *ibid.*, p. 183; Charles Thompson to John Jay, 15 Jan. 1783, *ibid.*, p. 417. Adams to M. Dumas, 6 Feb. 1781, JA, *Works*, VII, p. 367; to President of Congress, 11 July 1781, *ibid.*, p. 434, and 19 Mar. 1781, *ibid.*, p. 382; Adams, *Diary*, III, pp. 46, 115-116. On debts and war, see George Mason to Patrick Henry, 6 May 1783, Jack Greene, ed., *Colonies to Nation 1763-1789* (New York, 1975), p. 454. Jay to Gouverneur Morris, 29 Apr. 1778, JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*, I, p. 180; to Governor Livingston, 19 July 1783, *ibid.*, III, p. 55; to Hamilton, 28 Sept. 1783, *ibid.*, p. 91. The legists argued against vengeance. See Vattel, *Law of Nations*, pp. 280-291.

⁴⁵For Washington's views, see to Israel Putnam, 28 Feb. 1777, GW, *Writings*, VII, p. 210; to William Maxwell, 5 Sept. 1777, *ibid.*, IX, p. 183; to Sir Henry Clinton, 16 Sept. 1778, *ibid.*, XII, p. 466; to Governor William Livingston, 5 Oct. 1778, *ibid.*, XIII, p. 28; "Instructions to the Officer Commanding on the Croton," 3 Jan. 1783, *ibid.*, XXVI, pp. 9-10; "Circular to the States," 26 Aug. 1779, *ibid.*, XVI, p. 175; to John Beatty, 30 Oct. 1779, *ibid.*, XVII, p. 47. "American Commissioners to Prisoners in Britain, 20 Sept. 1778, JA, *Works*, VII, p. 41; to M. de Sartine, 30 Oct. 1778, *ibid.*, pp. 63-74. Hamilton to George Clinton, 12 Mar. 1778, AH, *Papers*, I, p. 441; "Questions Concerning a Proposed Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War," 10-11 Apr. 1778, *ibid.*, pp. 460-462. Madison, "Report on Rations for Prisoners of War," 10-11 June 1782, JM, *Papers*, IV, pp. 330-331; "Notes on Debates," 7-8, 22 Nov. 1782, *ibid.*, V, pp. 256-350, 303; to Edmund Randolph, 10 Nov. 1782, *ibid.*, p. 267. The Americans were disturbed that the British were allegedly making no distinction between officers and other ranks. "Retaliation Report," 11 June 1781, JCC, XX, p. 622.

⁴⁶See Sir George N. Clark, *War and Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 9-10, 51; Speier, "Militarism," pp. 234-239. Symcox, *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism*, pp. 1-33; Hinsley, *Power and Peace*, pp. 165-177; Luvaas, *Frederick* pp. 35-36, 44, 308-310.

⁴⁷Hamilton to Hugh Knox, July 1777, AH, *Papers*, I, p. 301; "Remarks on the Provisional Peace Treaty," 19 Mar. 1783, *ibid.*, III, pp. 294-295; "Motion on Instructions to Francis Dana," 21 May 1783, *ibid.*, p. 362; Stourzh, *Hamilton*, chap. iv, and Lyan, *Hamilton and Foreign Policy*, pp. 50-55, offer a more extended analysis. Hamilton's thinking clearly solidified in his contributions to the Federalist Papers. See Nos. 6-9, 11. Paine, "The Crisis," 7, 21 Nov. 1778, TP, *Writings*, I, pp. 277-278; "The Crisis," 8 Mar. 1780, *ibid.*, pp. 297-298. See also "Peace and the Newfoundland Fisheries," 30 June 1779, *ibid.*, II, p. 24. Adams to Comte de Vergennes, 19 July 1781, JA, *Works*, VII, p. 448; to President of Congress, 4 Aug. 1779, *ibid.*, p. 100; to Francis Dana, 15 Mar. 1782, *ibid.*, p. 544; *Diary*, III, p. 89.

⁴⁸"Instructions to Foreign Representatives," 30 Dec. 1776, JCC, VI, pp. 1054-1057. Madison to Edmund Randolph, 20 May 1783, JM, *Papers*, VII, pp. 59, 60-62; "Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison," 24 Dec. 1782, *ibid.*, V, p. 447. Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, 28 Nov. 1781, GW, *Writings*, XXIII, p. 360; to James McHenry, 11 Dec. 1781,

ibid., p. 381, and to same 15 Aug. 1782, *ibid.*, XXV, p. 22. See also Sam Adams to James Warren, 3 May 1777, *Letters*, II, p. 330; James Duane to GW, 9 Dec. 1780, *ibid.*, V, p. 479.

⁴⁹Josiah Bartlett to John Langdon, 27 Oct. 1778, *ibid.*, III, pp. 466-467; Thomas Burke to Richard Craswell, 9 Apr. 1778, *ibid.*, p. 162. See also Burke, "Abstract of Debates," *ibid.*, II, pp. 275-281, and "Notes on the Articles of Confederation," 15 Nov. 1777, *ibid.*, pp. 554-555; William Fleming to Thomas Jefferson, 22 June 1779, *ibid.*, IV, p. 281. The Board of War actually had little real power. See Jennings B. Saunders, *The Evolution of Executive Department of the Continental Congress 1774-1789* (Chapel Hill, 1935), pp. 8-10, 17. Congress controlled the privateers. Sidney G. Morse, "State or Continental Privateers?" *American Historical Review*, 52 (1946), pp. 68-73. Cooke to Washington, 21 Jan. 1776, Sparks, *Correspondence*, I, p. 132. "Articles of Confederation," VI *JCC*, IX, pp. 911-913.

⁵⁰Washington to President of Congress, 13 June 1776, GW, *Writings*, V, p. 128; to Fielding Lewis, 6 July 1780, *ibid.*, XIX, pp. 131-132; to John Parke Custis, 28 Feb. 1781, *ibid.*, XXI, p. 320. See also "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," *ibid.*, XXVI, pp. 374-398, *passim*. Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 7 Nov. 1780, JM, *Papers*, II, pp. 165-166; "Virginia Delegates to Jefferson, 23 Jan. 1781, *ibid.*, pp. 295-296; Madison to Jefferson, 18 Nov. 1781, *ibid.*, III, p. 308; to Edmund Randolph, 28 May 1782, *ibid.*, IV, p. 295; "Report on Property Recaptured on Land," 23 Dec. 1782, *ibid.*, V, pp. 432-433. On Pennsylvania seizure see Madison, "Notes on Debates," 24 Jan. 1783, *ibid.*, VI, p. 118; 27-28 Jan. 1783, *ibid.*, pp. 134-135, 142. For proposed taxation scheme for peacetime military, *ibid.*, pp. 432-433. Hurst, *Law of Treason*, pp. 81-92, reveals another aspect of this theme. See also "Powers of Congress," 3 Oct. 1780, *JCC*, XVIII, p. 897.

⁵¹Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (New York, 1953), p. 116, argues that even a crusade could be state policy. "Report on Rights of Neutral Nations," 12 June 1783, JM, *Papers*, VII, p. 138; John Jay, "On the Navigation of the Mississippi," May 1780, JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*, I, pp. 327-330; "Account of Conference with the French Minister at Madrid," 27 Aug. 1780, *ibid.*, p. 390; to Benjamin Franklin, 29 Mar. 1782, *ibid.*, II, 283; John Adams to James Warren, 27 Apr. 1777, JA, *Works*, IX, p. 462. J. Fred Rippy and Angie Debo, *The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation* (Northampton, 1924); Varg, *Policies of Fathers*; Gilbert, *Farewell Address*, chaps. i-ii; Louis B. Wright, "The Founding Fathers and 'Splendid Isolation'," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, VI (1943), pp. 173-196.

⁵²Morris to John Jay, 23 Sept. 1776, *Letters*, II, p. 197n. John Dickinson, "Draught of Instructions," 22 July 1779, *ibid.*, IV, p. 341. "On Mississippi Navigation," 17 Oct. 1780, *JCC*, XVIII, pp. 935-947, is a precise example of the way these interests were being expressed.

⁵³Gay, *Enlightenment*, II, pp. 40-41, 50-51. See also George R. Haven, *The Age of Ideas: From Reaction to Revolution in Eighteenth Century France* (New York, 1955), pp. 166-167, 177, 210; Gilbert, *Farewell Address*, pp. 56-68; Nef, *War and Human Progress*, pp. 302-328.

⁵⁴Grotius, *War and Peace*, p. 32. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Or, Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil* (Chicago, 1952), I, xiv, p. 86; II, xvii, p. 99. Leibniz, "Codex Iuris Gentium," (1693) in Patrick Riley, ed., *The Political Writings of Leibniz* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 166. Locke, *Second Essay*, III, xvi, p. 28; xix, p. 29; XIX, ccxxiii, p. 78. Cox, *Locke on War*, pp. 79, 104-105.

⁵⁵Jean Jacques Rousseau, *A Project of Perpetual Peace*, trans. Edith M. Nuttall (London, 1927), p. 21, reprinted in M. C. Jacob, ed., *Peace Projects of the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1974). Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York, 1965), pp. 54-87. See Carl J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 146-149, 152, for Spinoza and Hume;

Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, X, ii, p. 61; I, iii, p. 2. Voltaire, "A Philosophical Dictionary," *The Works of Voltaire*, ed., John Morley (New York, 1901, 16 vols.), XIV, pp. 194-200.

⁵⁶Hinsley, *Power and Peace*, pp. 15, 23, 32; "William Penn's Plan for the Peace of Europe," *Old South Leaflets* (New York, n. d.), III, no. 75. See Sylvester John Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries* (New York, 1972), pp. 50-70.

⁵⁷Stourzh, *Hamilton*, pp. 130-136, 147. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, 1954), chap. iv; Nef, *War and Human Progress*, pp. 310-311.

⁵⁸Sam Adams to James Warren, 20 Oct. 1778, *Letters* III, p. 458. See also Jefferson, "Notes on the State of Virginia," in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Works of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1905, 12 vols.) III, pp. 438-439; IV, pp. 28, 98-100. Paine, "Common Sense," TP, *Writings* I, pp. 75, 89, 96-97, 117; "The Crisis," 3, 19 Apr. 1777, *ibid.*, pp. 206-207. John Witherspoon, 25 Nov. 1778, *Letters*, III, p. 511.

⁵⁹Hamilton to George Clinton, 3 Oct. 1783, AH, *Papers*, IV, 468. Jay to Gouverneur Morris, 24 Sept. 1783, JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*, II, 83-84. Franklin to Edmund Burke, 15 Oct. 1781, "Franklin on War," pp. 4, 12. See also Franklin as cited in Colbourn, *Lamp of Experience*, p. 131. Madison to Jefferson, 16 Apr. 1781, JM, *Papers*, III, p. 72. For a brief analysis of Madison's views on human nature which is directly relevant to his view of war, see Ralph L. Ketchum, "James Madison and the Nature of Man," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 19 (1958), pp. 62-76.

⁶⁰Adams to Abigail Adams, 23 Oct. 1775, Adams, *Correspondence*, I, p. 312; to same, 11 Feb. 1776, *ibid.*, p. 346; to same, 20 Aug. 1777, *ibid.*, II, pp. 320-321; to Mr. Calkoen, 18 Oct. 1780, JA, *Works*, VII, p. 306. Kelly, "American Seaborne Independence," pp. xix-xxi, xxvi. For Adams, entanglement in European politics meant war. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70, 168-169. For Adams on pacifism of republics see *Diary*, II, p. 408; to M. Bergsma, 5 Mar. 1782, JA, *Works*, VII, p. 535; to John Luzac, 15 Sept. 1780, *ibid.*, p. 256; to Franklin, 17 Aug. 1780, *ibid.*, p. 247.

⁶¹Shute, *Thanksgiving Sermon*, p. 18, Stillman, *A Sermon*, pp. 28-29, 32. Eli Forbes, *The Dignity and Importance of the Military Character Illustrated* (Boston, 1771), pp. 1-3, Evans No. 12044. Belknap, *A Sermon*, pp. 6-7. Fish, *War Lawful*, pp. 9-10, 11-13. Carmichael, *Self-Defensive War Lawful*, pp. 8-9, 24-25. Anthony Benezet, *Thoughts on the Nature of War*, & c (Philadelphia, 1776), p. 2, Evans No. 14662. Zabdiel Adams, *The Grounds of Confidence and Success in War Represented* (Boston, 1775), pp. 1-4, Evans No. 13789. For war and monarchy see especially Adams, *Evil Designs of Men*, pp. 26-29.

⁶²"Peace Army" 10 Sept. 1783, JCC, XXV, 722-744. Citation on *ibid.*, p. 739. Washington to Fielding Lewis, 6 July 1780. GW, *Writings*, XIX, p. 133; to President of Congress, 20 Aug. 1780, *ibid.*, p. 410; to Marquis de Lafayette, 12 Oct. 1783, *ibid.*, XXVII, pp. 187-188. Hamilton, "The Continentalist," 2, 19 July 1781, AH, *Papers*, II, pp. 655-657; 3, 9 Aug. 1781, *ibid.*, pp. 660-661; 6, 4 July 1782, *ibid.*, III, p. 102; "Report on a Military Establishment," 18 June 1783, *ibid.*, pp. 378-395. See letters to James Duane, 3 Sept. 1780, *ibid.*, II, pp. 403-408; to Washington, 24 March 1783, *ibid.*, III, p. 304; to Robert Morris, 30 Apr. 1781, *ibid.*, II, pp. 618-619; to George Clinton, 3 Oct. 1783, *ibid.*, III, pp. 467-468. Stourzh, *Hamilton*, pp. 162-165.

⁶³Franklin, "On War and Peace," pp. 5, 10-11. Jay to John Adams, 17 July 1780, JJ, *Correspondence and Papers*, I, p. 380; to same 2 Aug. 1782, *ibid.*, II, p. 325; to Greene, 4 Mar. 1783, *ibid.*, III, p. 33; to Governor Livingston, 19 July 1783, *ibid.*, p. 55. Madison to James Madison, Sr., 30 Mar. 1782, JM, *Papers*, IV, p. 127; Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison, 7 May 1782, *ibid.*, pp. 214-215; same to same, 9 Aug. 1782, *ibid.*, V, p. 39. Madison to Edmund Randolph, 14 May 1782, *ibid.*, IV, p. 241. Adams to John Quincy Adams, 11 Aug. 1775, Adams, *Correspondence*, II, p. 307; to Secretary Livingston, 17 July

1783, JA, *Works*, VIII, pp. 106-107; *Diary*, III, pp. 63, 65, 77. For neutrality see *ibid.*, II, p. 358, III, p. 93; to Richard Cranch, 17 June 1782, Adams, *Correspondence*, IV, p. 332. See also James Munroe to Richard Henry Lee, 16 Dec. 1783, *Letters*, VII, p. 391; "Report of the Committee on Despatches from Foreign Ministers," 25 Sept. 1783, *ibid.*, pp. 305-306. For the ways in which this awareness carried through the 1780s see Frederick W. Marks, III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution* (Baton Rouge, 1973), chap. i.

⁶⁴"Retaliation Report," 11 June 1781, JCC, XX, pp. 620-621, noted that "humanity and the practice of civilized nations" were the only forms of restraint in war. Adrienne Koch, *Power, Morals and the Founding Fathers: Essays in the Interpretation of the American Enlightenment* (Ithaca, 1961), pp. 2-3, argues that all the Founding Fathers appreciated the role of power in human affairs but wanted it balanced by morality. Jefferson saw reason as the only effective counterforce to the indiscriminate application of power. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47. See also Gilbert, *Farewell Address*, pp. 49-52, 66-69. Paine, "Common Sense," TP, *Writings*, I, pp. 88-89; "The Crisis," 7, 21 Nov. 1778, *ibid.*, p. 278; 9, 6 Oct. 1780, *ibid.*, pp. 306-307. Varg, *Policies of Fathers*, chaps. i-ii, discusses American ideas about the relationship of trade, foreign policy, and peace.

